Socialist (Pakistan)
An online magazine supplement to monthly Socialist Urdu
Democracy,
Islamicism and Dictatorship in
01/03/2008
Interview
with Haroon Khalid, IS In
the Western media Benazir Bhutto is portrayed as the last great saviour of Enormous
expectations were attached to Benazir, particularly among workers and the
poor who hoped that she would be able to address their dire economic
situation. Inflation is extremely high and is wiping out wages and this is
coupled with massive unemployment. A 12-year
long programme of privatisation—which has included schools and
universities—has made access to services even more difficult for the
majority, and hundreds of thousands of people have been laid-off. People
were really hoping that Benazir would bring some change and that she would
stand up for them. This despite that her two periods as prime minister were
characterised by corruption and greed, and the fact that she sought to
compromise with big business and largely followed their agenda. Expectations
that Benazir would act for the poor stem partly from the origin of the
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which she led. When the party was founded by
Benazir’s father—and former prime minister—Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967, it raised the slogan, “Clothing,
housing and food for everyone”. Zulfikar
was elected as prime minister in 1971, talking of socialism and surrounding
himself with a number of left wing ministers. Yet within a few short years
Zulfikar was reneging on his promises and expelling socialists from the
party. On
her recent return to Pakistan Benazir was attempting to hark back to this
era. Most of her speeches were about the need for decent jobs and an improved
standard of living for the majority. Many were taken in by all this talk. Pakistani
and US ruling classes regard political leaders that have the backing of the
masses as extremely dangerous. And, despite her record, Benazir had a great
deal of support among the masses. Sensing
that president Musharraf was becoming less viable as leader, the US moved to
co-opt Benazir in the hope that she could maintain Pakistan’s
allegiance to the ‘war on terror’. They promised to force
Musharraf—who they had extensively backed—into a power-sharing
arrangement with the PPP. As
it became clear that this arrangement was untenable Benazir was murdered, and
now many Pakistanis see the hand of Musharraf, not the Islamists, behind her
killing. Western
commentators have often said that Musharraf is a last barrier which prevents
“Islamic fundamentalists” from taking over the state, and that
therefore he should be supported. What is the relationship between the
Islamist movements and the state? The
government is deliberately cultivating this image, both at home and abroad.
There are some terrorist incidents, and they are often in response to
Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas—like recent air
strikes on village that killed more than fifty people. The
state quickly classifies them “suicide bombings” saying that
there are no leads to follow-up, and that the investigation should be closed
down. In very few cases is any evidence presented as to who is responsible
for the attack and what their motivation was. In
this way Musharraf raises the prospect of a widespread
“terrorist” threat. As a
result of the army’s attacks on the villages, there are many areas in
which the state has become so unpopular that local officials cannot even
perform basic functions, like opening their offices and schools. In
these areas there are frequent attacks, but in no way are extremists poised
to take over the central state—that is a complete exaggeration. The
rightwing radical Islamist political parties, which are in the mainstream,
are divided between those that support the Musharraf regime, and those who
are against it. The
government has sought to co-opt many of these parties by offering them a role
in running their localities. The government has funded various Islamic
schools and parallel legal processes, all of which mean jobs and money for
those involved in delivering the services. So
many parties and tribal leaders have a vested interest in maintaining the
Musharraf regime. Those who are against him often cite their anger with the
government’s backing for the ‘war on terror’. But
Islamist parties have been in government in the What
is the state of the democracy movement in The
lawyers’ movement, which culminated last year with the campaign to have
the chief justice restored to his job after Musharraf sacked him, attracted
the support of many journalists, civil society activists and students. They
took to the streets in large numbers and were violently attacked by the
state. Yet
disgracefully, the mainstream political parties—including the
PPP—refused to join with them, instead preferring to keep their doors
open for talks with the government. This left the movement vulnerable to the
crackdown. Virtually
all of the lawyers’ movement was arrested. Since
the lifting of the state of emergency towards the end of last year and the
announcement of elections, the movement has started to retreat. The
leadership of the lawyers’ organisation split on the question of
whether they should continue their campaign and become still more
“political” by calling for the removal of Musharraf, or return to
being simply a professional body. The
students, however, are a very interesting new opening for the democracy
movement—despite not being huge in number. Most who have joined come
from the elite universities, and they have continued their protests on the
campuses and on streets. There
has been no student movement, independent of the main parties, for almost
three decades. The
students tend to be morally disaffected from the regime, but often believe
that Musharraf’s economic policies were beneficial for the country.
They are demanding a democratic system similar to those of in the West. The
working class have played only a very minor role in the democracy movement so
far. Despite a limited revival in strikes and struggle in recent years, years
of military crackdown, privatisation, job losses and price rises have
affected workers’ confidence to fight. Many
workers gave the lawyers’ movement silent support, hoping that it could
make a breakthrough that would create space for the unions too. There is
little doubt though that if the leaders of the main opposition parties had
called the people on the streets that workers would have had the confidence
to act, and that the regime would have fallen. What
effect will Benazir’s death have on the ability of the Musharraf regime
to continue to govern? The
assassination has greatly weakened the regime, which is increasingly forced
to rely on the military to defend it. The Benazir’s
death has heightened these tensions and the military have now moved into a
third province, Sindh—which includes the port city of On
television last week Musharraf said the army will remain deployed until well
after the scheduled elections have passed, and that no protests will be
allowed. A government that is forced to outlaw protests is a very weak
one—one with little backing in the country. The
primary reason that Musharraf’s postponed the elections is that his
personal ratings have dived and his political allies were in no shape to
mount a campaign. The likelihood was that he would be driven from office. Rather
than calming the instability in None
of the main political parties can solve the crisis created by neoliberalism
and the ‘war on terror’ and the frequency of national political
crises is increasing. The ruling class is looking increasingly unstable. The The
weakness of the ruling class can be a great opportunity for the movement
demanding genuine democracy. Ends |
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